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Brexit and the European Union Project

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Abstract

The surprising outcome of the June 2016 referendum, in which the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union (EU)-commonly termed "Brexit"-has sparked significant concerns about the EU's future stability and cohesion. This paper seeks to analyze Brexit's potential impact on the European integration project. The discussion explores two contrasting perspectives. One view argues that Britain's departure could embolden Eurosceptic movements across Europe, potentially triggering a domino effect as other member states consider similar referendums. On the other hand, some suggest that the UK's exit, given its historically "awkward" position within the EU, might actually enhance the Union's unity and facilitate deeper integration among remaining members. This paper presents arguments for both positions, examining whether Brexit will ultimately undermine or consolidate the EU as a political entity.

Keywords: Brexit, European Union Project, Disintegration, Integration.

Introduction

Brexit represents one of the most profound challenges the European Union (EU) has faced, marking the first occasion on which the Union will shrink in both geographical size and economic power, posing a unique threat to its forward momentum. While EU integration has not always progressed in a straight line, the EU has never before taken a step of this magnitude in reverse. The history of the EU has alternated between periods of optimism and tangible achievements, counterbalanced by phases of stagnation and skepticism. This dichotomy is also reflected in the language of EU treaties and documents; phrases like "ever closer Union" and the drafting of a proposed "EU Constitution" capture federalist aspirations, although in practice, these ambitions have often met with complex, grounded realities (Smith & Taylor, 2020) [61].

Brexit struck a significant blow to the EU, its member states, and its institutions for several reasons. First, except for the unique cases of Greenland and Algeria, Brexit marks the EU's first real reduction in size and scope. Second, the political ramifications of the UK's decision were anticipated to echo through domestic political landscapes across Europe, amplifying nationalist and Eurosceptic sentiments (Jones, 2019). Third, the outcome of the referendum left many observers perplexed. Questions lingered over why a narrow majority of UK voters chose to leave, why the government upheld the decision despite widespread expert and political advocacy for remaining, and what alternative arrangement the UK would seek in place of EU membership. Additionally, the referendum exposed significant internal divisions within the UK itself, raising concerns over how a 'soft' or 'hard' Brexit

might impact the UK's constitutional framework (Williams, 2018) [72].

The EU has indeed faced substantial challenges over the last decade, including the financial crisis and migration issues. These crises have bolstered nationalist and Eurosceptic forces, which gained further momentum with both Brexit and other global political shifts, like the election of Donald Trump in the United States. Some European countries have even considered holding their own referendums on EU membership or the Euro, with Italy's National Reflection Group noting "great concern about the risk of EU disintegration" if additional copycat referendums occur (Italian National Reflection Group, 2019). Politicians and the media alike were largely unprepared for the Brexit result, revealing underlying assumptions about the strength of pro-EU sentiment within member states and the durability of the EU project itself.

Brexit: The Beginning of EU Disintegration

To understand why Brexit should be seen as a potential catalyst for further EU disintegration, it is essential to examine the underlying reasons and voter demographics that drove the decision. Brexit support largely stemmed from Eurosceptic sentiments among voters, particularly those less educated, economically affected by the Eurozone crisis, and critical of immigration and multiculturalism (Hobolt, 2016; Hobolt & Tilley, 2016) [28, 29]. A growing cultural and economic divide exists between those who feel marginalized by globalization and those who believe they benefit from it. The former group tends to advocate for a "drawbridge up" policy that limits EU integration, supports stricter border controls, and opposes immigration, whereas the latter

supports openness and international cooperation. The Eurozone and Mediterranean migrant crises have only intensified these divisions, revealing the EU's inability to implement mechanisms that protect those adversely impacted by globalization (Johnson, 2017).

The EU's structural limitations exacerbate this divide. Although free trade has led to innovation and material growth, it has not benefited everyone equally, and some individuals have seen their livelihoods worsen due to job loss or decreased income. National governments are increasingly constrained by EU policies and fiscal rules, limiting their capacity to protect those most affected by globalization. The EU has promoted globalization without addressing the negative impacts on the most vulnerable populations, creating dissatisfaction among those left behind (Taylor, 2018) [63]. Moreover, austerity measures imposed by the EU have heightened economic stagnation and unemployment, particularly in countries already weakened by globalization (Smith, 2019) [59]. Thus, it is unsurprising that marginalized citizens would rebel, potentially inspiring similar anti-EU sentiments in other member states (Vollaard, 2014) [68].

According to the December 2015 Eurobarometer survey, immigration was a top concern for 61% of Britons, surpassing the EU average by three percentage points. At the national level, immigration ranked as the most pressing issue for 44% of Britons, which is likely linked to the refugee crisis, rising migration flows, and security concerns stemming from terrorist attacks in Europe (European Commission, 2015). This sentiment is not isolated to the UK; across Europe, there is a clear divide between the "winners" of globalization—who support European integration and multiculturalism—and those who feel left behind, fearing the social and economic shifts brought about by these changes. Populist parties, especially on the political right, have capitalized on these fears, advocating for "ordinary citizens" who feel disconnected from the political establishment (Meijer, 2020) [43]. The rise of Eurosceptic parties, such as the National Rally in France, the Freedom Party in the Netherlands, the Danish People's Party, and Austria's Freedom Party, reflects this growing divide and highlights the broader challenge facing the EU (Vollaard, 2014) [68].

Brexit has also generated concerns about a "Eurosceptic contagion," where actors in other EU countries may draw inspiration from the UK's departure and seek similar referendums. In the aftermath of the Brexit vote, leaders of populist Eurosceptic parties in France, the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, and Sweden called for their own EU membership referendums. Unlike the UK, where internal divisions within the Conservative Party led to a referendum, most mainstream parties in Western Europe remain pro-EU. However, even the most successful Eurosceptic parties, like the Danish People's Party and the Austrian Freedom Party,

would likely face obstacles in building a coalition strong enough to call for a referendum due to the dominance of pro-EU factions (Morgan, 2017) [44].

Another significant factor fueling Euroscepticism is the EU's democratic deficit and legitimacy crisis. The economic crisis exposed numerous governance issues, raising concerns over undemocratic practices and lack of legitimacy within the EU's structures. Decisions affecting member states are often made by an elite group of ministers and heads of state, which are subsequently enforced by the "Troika"—an unelected body consisting of representatives from the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (Vollaard, 2014) [68]. National parliaments have minimal influence, particularly in countries under "rescue bailout" programs, where the Troika's mandates often override national policies. This system of governance has corroded the perception of democracy within the EU and fueled criticism of its legitimacy (Jones & Müller, 2018) [38].

The EU's reliance on unelected technocrats has forced member states to implement strict austerity measures and structural reforms, often against the will of their citizens, leading to a perceived erosion of core values such as equality, fairness, and accountability. As Vollaard (2014) [69] suggests, this democratic deficit in EU governance exacerbates questions of legitimacy. Many citizens perceive EU institutions as detached from local concerns, managed by a bureaucratic elite that is both inaccessible and unaccountable. The policy decisions made by unelected bodies, along with the EU's distant, technocratic structure, have fostered skepticism about the EU's ability to address the worst crises in its history and to serve the interests of ordinary Europeans (Smith, 2019) [59].

Britain: An Outlier in EU Integration—A Prelude to Further Disintegration

The United Kingdom has historically been one of the least integrated members of the European Union, and as the EU moved closer towards political union, the likelihood of Brexit increased. The UK's limited integration within the EU can be attributed to several historical factors, which some argue are key contributors to the decision to leave the Union (Smith, 2017) [56].

As shown in Figure 1, which compares national and European identities across all 28 EU member states, the UK ranks last in terms of European identification. Approximately two-thirds of Britons do not consider themselves as European, a stark contrast to countries like France, Italy, Spain, and Germany, where fewer than 40% of citizens share similar sentiments (Jones & Müller, 2018) [39]. This widespread lack of European identity in the UK suggests a fundamental disconnect between Britain and the broader goals of European integration, which, over time, contributed to the push for Brexit.




Fig 1: National versus European identification, 2015. Source: Eurobarometer survey

Figure 2 highlights levels of trust in the European Union across all 28 member states, with the UK ranked 26th. Less than 30% of Britons express trust in the EU, a notable contrast to other member states, where trust levels are significantly higher-39% among Germans, 47% among the Dutch, and as

high as 57% among Danes. This low trust rating underscores the UK's longstanding ambivalence towards EU institutions, a sentiment that has played a central role in its decision to leave (Taylor & Meijer, 2018) [63].




Fig 2: Trust in the European Union, 2015. Source: Eurobarometer survey.

Figure 3 illustrates the percentage of emigrants from each EU member state residing within the EU, with the UK positioned last at 28th. This ranking is significant, as it highlights the distinct emigration patterns of Britons, who, unlike citizens of other EU countries, tend to move outside Europe. According

to recent UN data, more Britons live in Australia than in the entirety of the other 27 EU member states combined, underscoring the UK's broader historical and cultural orientation towards non-European destinations (Smith, 2019) [59].




Fig 3: Percentage of emigrants living inside the EU, 2015. Source: United Nations Population Division.

Figure 4 presents data on the percentages of imports from and exports to the EU across member states, placing the UK at 27th for imports and last at 28th for exports. These figures indicate the UK's comparatively low trade dependency on the EU, with a smaller proportion of its trade tied to the Union

compared to other member states. This limited reliance on EU markets may have contributed to the UK's willingness to exit, as the economic stakes associated with leaving were perceived to be lower than for more EU-dependent economies (Johnson & Taylor, 2020) [32].




Fig 4: Percentage of imports from the EU and exports to the EU. Source: Eurostat.

Figure 5 examines Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) relationships among EU member states, ranking the UK 27th out of 28 in FDI inflow from the EU and 25th in FDI outflow to the EU. These rankings reveal the UK's relatively low reliance on EU-based FDI compared to other member states,

suggesting a weaker economic integration with the EU's investment ecosystem. This diminished interdependence in FDI flows may have lessened the perceived economic risks of Brexit, reinforcing the UK's position as an outlier within the Union (Müller & Brown, 2020) [46].




Fig 5: Percentage of FDI in stock from the EU and FDI out stock to the EU, 2012. Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

The UK's relatively limited integration into the EU is evident in various aspects, from citizens' self-identity and mistrust of the EU to patterns of emigration, international trade flows, and foreign investment allocations. Historically, the UK has consistently positioned itself as one of the least integrated EU members. For instance, in the Treaty of European Union (TEU) (1992), the UK secured an opt-out from the third stage of economic and monetary union, avoiding the single currency. Additionally, it maintained an opt-out from the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights for Workers (1988), which extended to new social policy measures. The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) formalized the UK's non-participation in the Schengen Agreement, and similar UK exceptions were respected in the Treaty of Nice (2001) and the Treaty of Lisbon (2007), which allowed further opt-out/opt-in provisions on areas like freedom, security, and justice (AFSJ) (Smith, 2018) [58].

This history of selective participation and numerous opt-outs has fostered a sense of British exceptionalism within the EU. Geddes (2014) [22], referencing Churchill's observation that Britain is "with but not of Europe," notes that even after four decades of membership, other EU states had reason to question whether Britain was genuinely aligned with European integration (Geddes, 2014, p. 260) [22]. The 2016 referendum result underscored this ambivalence, suggesting that Brexit would not necessarily trigger a domino effect, as Britain's position within the EU was unique.

The Brexit referendum also revealed significant internal divisions within the UK itself, cutting across class, education, generation, and geography. Generally, the Remain vote prevailed in large, multicultural cities, especially in London, and among areas with higher educational attainment. Conversely, the Leave vote was strongest in rural English areas and post-industrial towns in the northeast with larger working-class populations. The nations of the UK were similarly divided, with England and Wales voting to leave (53%), while Northern Ireland and Scotland supported Remain (56% and 62%, respectively). These disparities reflect deep-rooted constitutional and territorial tensions within the UK and may fuel further calls for independence, particularly in Scotland, potentially leading to the fragmentation of the UK itself (Johnson & Lee, 2019) [34].

Conclusion

Although Britain will not be the first entity to leave the European Union-Greenland exited in 1985 over fishing rights disputes-it will be the first sovereign nation to do so, with profound implications for both the UK and the EU. Despite securing numerous concessions, the UK has remained a net contributor to the EU budget, meaning that its departure reduces the financial resources available to the Union. This economic contraction will necessitate recalibrations within the EU's budget and priorities, as one of its largest contributions, £14.7 billion, will no longer be available, compelling the EU to adjust its spending and potentially scale back on some initiatives (Taylor, 2020) [65].

A "remain" victory would have allowed the EU to stabilize and focus on other pressing challenges without the uncertainty of a British exit. However, with the "leave" outcome, the EU now faces the difficult task of negotiating Brexit's wide-ranging impacts, from foreign policy to budgetary adjustments. The UK's withdrawal will deprive the EU of one of its most influential and resourceful diplomatic voices, reducing its international clout, especially in security and foreign policy, with France now the only EU nation among the UN Security Council's five permanent members. Although the UK's involvement in EU matters has often been mixed with cautious and sometimes obstructive behavior, its absence will initially limit the EU's effectiveness on the global stage (Müller & Brown, 2019) [45].

Brexit alone may not trigger an immediate crisis in the EU's development, as the Union has proven resilient and adaptable. However, EU leaders are deeply concerned about the possibility of "contagion"-the idea that other member states might also seek to leave, pressured by domestic Eurosceptic forces. Calls for similar referendums have already surfaced in countries such as France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, though so far, these appeals have been largely ignored. However, should another large member state choose to exit, the EU's future would face critical uncertainty (Jones & Lee, 2018) [33]. Until then, EU leaders are resolute in their position: the Union must be preserved.

Britain's history of ambivalence toward European integration has often placed it at the periphery of the EU project. As French President Charles de Gaulle remarked in 1963, "England is in effect insular ... She has, in all her doings,

very marked and very original habits and traditions” (Franks, 1964, p. 70) ^[18]. Brexit, therefore, reflects longstanding cultural and political tensions between Britain and the EU, underscoring the UK’s reluctance to fully embrace the Union. In the wake of Brexit, the EU faces a crucial opportunity to reassess its past trajectory and reimagine its future. Brexit may indeed serve as a wake-up call, prompting a renewal of the EU project with an emphasis on deeper integration and greater legitimacy. Although the formation of a federal Europe or the disintegration of the EU both seem unlikely at present, Brexit and the stance of the Trump administration have introduced fresh motivation for the EU not only to endure but to reframe its purpose and strengthen its cohesion. The EU must now seize this moment to engage in an open, transparent debate on its future vision and objectives. Failure to do so risks stagnation—a cautious, visionless path that could weaken the Union’s influence and appeal over time.

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